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Abstract 
Voluntary contribution experiments systematically find that contributions decline over 
time. We use a two-stage voluntary contribution game to investigate whether this 
decrease is caused by learning or strategic behavior. Using a strategy method we find a 
robust pattern of declining contributions: contributions in stage two are 45% lower than 
in stage one. Repeating the game five times we find that experience generates a smaller 
decline in contributions: stage one contributions decrease by around 7% per game. 
Finally we find no significant differences between the strategy and direct response 
method, which suggests that our results help explain behavior in the latter. 
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1. Introduction 
A robust finding in experimental studies of voluntary contribution games is that 
cooperation decreases with repeated interaction. Two explanations have been provided 
for this result. One is that strategies initially are well-defined, but that they depend on the 
history of play and therefore may cause players to change their actions over the course of 
the game. Another is that participants slowly begin to understand the game and refine 
their strategies accordingly.  While both of these explanations are convincing, limited 
work has been done to determine directly the role played by each. The purpose of this 
study is to provide such an examination.  
 To determine the extent to which decreasing contributions arise as a result of 
history-dependent strategies we need to identify the participants’ strategies in a multi-
stage voluntary contribution game. To do so we apply the strategy method (Selten, 1967) 
to a two-stage voluntary-contribution game. Participants submit a plan of action for the 
two-stage game, specifying a stage-one contribution and a stage-two response to any 
possible number of aggregate stage-one contributions by other group members. The plan 
is then matched with that of two other participants, and actions are taken in accordance 
with the participant’s strategy. An advantage of the strategy method is that participants 
make a decision for every possible history of aggregate contributions, not just those 
reached in the course of actual play. Thus participants indicate how they would respond 
to different contributions, making it straightforward to identify strategies. We find that 
the pattern of contributions is comparable to the results from previous repeated voluntary-
contribution experiments in that the elicited strategies imply declining average 
Blinded Manuscript (NO Author Details)
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contributions. The elicited strategies cause contributions to decline by an average of 45% 
within the two-stage games. 
  To examine the potential role played by learning we have participants play a 
sequence of five two-stage games, playing against a new set of people in each game. This 
allows us to examine whether experience with the game leads to a modification of 
strategies and whether such modifications decrease contributions. We find that 
individuals do modify their strategies across games, and as a result contributions in stage 
one sometimes increase and sometimes decrease across successive games. On average 
stage-one contributions decrease by 7% per game. Stage two contributions decrease more 
reliably across games, but the average decrease is still only 14% per game. Thus 
experience with the game leads to an erratic and less pronounced deterioration in 
contributions, compared with the systematic and substantial deterioration generated by 
submitted strategies. 
We observe, as in previous studies, considerable heterogeneity in submitted 
strategies. Following Fischbacher et al. (2001), we classify participants on the basis of the 
strategies they submit, and in any game most participants are classified as “free-riders” 
(participants who contribute nothing in stage two) or “conditional cooperators” 
(contributors whose stage-two contribution increases with other group members’ stage-
one contribution). Individual strategies are not stable across games, as many participants 
switch from one class to another across successive games. While a potential 
interpretation is that these participants do not have stable preferences, we cannot rule out 
that participants nonetheless have well-defined preferences over the outcome of the two-
stage game. The reason is that experience may help participants better understand the 
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game and may cause them to update their prior on the strategies others use when playing 
the game. Thus participants may be uncertain of what strategies best serve their interests 
and revise strategies as they learn how their own strategies influence outcomes. While 
participants often change their strategies from game to game, the distribution of strategies 
is quite stable: the proportions of different types do not change much from game to game. 
A potential disadvantage of the strategy method is that it may elicit strategies that 
differ from those used by participants in a traditional experiment based on a ‘direct-
response’ method. The direct-response method, applied to this game, would have 
participants make simultaneous stage-one contributions, and then, after observing 
aggregate stage-one contributions, participants would make simultaneous stage-two 
contributions. For our strategy-method examination to shed light on the decrease in 
contributions observed in direct-response games it is necessary that the elicited behavior 
is similar across the two elicitations. Although the two methods are equivalent from a 
standard theoretical point of view, there are plausible behavioral reasons why differences 
may emerge (see the discussions in Roth 1995 or Brandts and Charness 2000). For 
example, eliciting a strategy for the two-stage game encourages subjects to consider stage 
two when making their stage-one decision; if the two stages were played out in sequence 
a subject might make a stage-one decision without giving any consideration to stage two. 
If behavior under the direct-response method differs from that under the strategy method, 
then it is unreasonable to argue that we can use elicited strategies to shed light on the 
decrease in contributions observed in the direct-response interaction.  
Previous research delivers mixed evidence on whether people behave differently 
according to whether the strategy or direct-response method is used. Brandts and 
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Charness (2000) examined Sequential Prisoners’ Dilemma and Sequential Chicken 
games and found no significant differences between outcomes elicited by direct-response 
and strategy-method approaches. They carefully conclude (p.234): “in games of low 
complexity, the strategy method may be a valid technique for collecting a rich data set 
without affecting participants’ decisions significantly.” However, other studies provide 
evidence of significant differences between direct-response and strategy-method 
approaches. For example, Güth et al. (2001) compare alternative versions of a mini-
ultimatum game and find significant differences when the direct-response method is used, 
but not when a strategy method is used, Brandts and Charness (2003) study a game with 
pre-play communication in which players can punish opponents who send misleading 
messages and find that under a direct-response method punishment rates are significantly 
higher than under a strategy method, and Burton et al. (2005) study coordination games 
with pre-play communication, finding that under a direct-response method coordination 
on the efficient equilibrium was significantly lower than under a strategy method.  
Thus, since equivalence between the two elicitation procedures cannot be taken 
for granted, to test the validity of the strategy-method implementation of our game we 
also run a direct-response version of the game where participants simultaneously choose 
contributions for the first stage, are informed of stage-one contributions, and then play 
the second stage. Our results reveal that the contributions elicited by the strategy method 
are no different from those of our control, direct-response treatment. Thus the behavior 
that results from the elicited strategies is consistent with that of the direct-response 
games.  
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we review the 
related literature. We then describe our experimental design and procedures in Section 3. 
The results are presented in Section 4, and we conclude in Section 5. 
 
2. Literature Review 
A number of studies have examined contributions in a repeated voluntary contribution 
game.  Among the first is Isaac and Walker (1988) who, in a series of repeated linear 
public goods games, find that repetition causes free riding to increase and contributions to 
‘decay.’ With ten repetitions of the game contributions tend to start out at about half the 
endowment and decrease to about 15-25% of the endowment in round ten. The two most 
common arguments for this decrease in contributions are that as the game is repeated, 
errors diminish as participants learn to free ride and that with repetitions, participants can 
play history-dependent strategies, potentially causing both conditional cooperators and 
free riders to decrease their contributions over the course of the game.  
A number of studies have used indirect tests to determine whether the ‘learning’ 
or the ‘strategies’ hypothesis is the likely cause of the decay in contributions.  To 
examine whether participants at the end of the repeated game have learned to free ride, 
Isaac and Walker invited past participants back to the laboratory to determine if their 
contribution rates differed from that of inexperienced participants. In contrast to the 
learning hypothesis and in support of the strategies hypothesis, behavior of experienced 
and inexperienced participants is practically the same. Initial contributions are high and 
then decrease as the game is repeated.  
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Andreoni (1988) uses a different approach to examine the two hypotheses. He 
argues that if the decay in cooperation is caused by state-contingent strategies then 
contributions should be larger when participants play in a finitely repeated game 
(partners) than when they are randomly paired with new participants after every 
repetition of the game (strangers). To test the learning hypothesis further he also 
examines the effect of restarting the game after ten periods.  If the decay in contributions 
is caused by participants learning to free-ride, then contributions should be unaffected by 
the restart. His study provides evidence against both hypotheses. First, in contrast to the 
learning hypothesis, restarting the experiment causes a significant increase in 
contributions in the partner treatment. Second, in every round of the game contributions 
are larger in the stranger than partner treatment, suggesting that the decay in contributions 
cannot be caused by strategic play alone.1  
Other researchers have subsequently used Andreoni’s design to compare the 
behavior of partners versus strangers. While these have succeeded in replicating the 
restart effect, the evidence is mixed when replicating higher contributions in the stranger 
treatment.2 Andreoni and Croson (2002) summarize these mixed findings and conclude, 
along the lines of Palfrey and Prisbrey (1996), that the reason why contributions in the 
stranger treatments sometimes are larger and sometimes smaller than in the partner 
treatment is that confusion or errors seem to be larger in the stranger treatment. In 
addition to errors differing between the two treatments, it has also been noted that both 
                                                          
1 Andreoni and Croson (2002) argue that “...with plenty of experience in a number of finitely repeated 
games, subjects will learn the benefits of reputation building. In a single finitely repeated game, such as 
these public goods experiments, these results indicate that subjects are unlikely to have learned the 
sophisticated strategy of reputation building” (footnote 6). 
2 See for example Croson (1996). 
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the decision-making process and the manner in which one learns across games can differ 
substantially between the two treatments. Thus it is not clear that by comparing 
contributions in the partners versus strangers treatments we can determine what causes 
the decay in contributions in the partner treatments.3
This paper uses a different approach to distinguish between the two hypotheses.  
First our learning hypothesis is broader, as we do not focus solely on learning as a 
process that teaches participants to free ride over time; rather we examine a repeated 
public good game multiple times, and we attribute any modification of strategies and 
resulting changes in contributions between supergames as being due to learning.4 Second, 
in determining the role of strategic play we directly elicit the participants’ strategies in 
the repeated public good game. Thus we do not try to infer the strategies by comparing 
behavior in two different treatments. While others previously have applied the strategy 
method to public good games, our approach is unique in that we elicit strategies over the 
entire repeated public good game and use these strategies to determine whether the 
decrease in contributions is due to learning or state-contingent strategies.  
For example, Fischbacher et al. apply a strategy method to a sequential voluntary-
contributions game where three group members first make simultaneous contributions, 
and then after observing their total contribution, a fourth group member makes her 
contribution. In their experiment the fourth group member indicates a contribution for 
each possible average contribution by the other three. Thus they can determine whether 
                                                          
3 Along the lines of the learning hypothesis a series of other studies have argued that the decay in 
contributions in the strangers environment primarily is caused by a decrease in errors (see e.g., Andreoni 
1995, Palfrey and Prisbrey 1996, and Houser and Kurzban 2002). 
4 Note that this can include learning in terms of developing an improved understanding of the game as well 
as learning in terms of updating priors on the anticipated strategies of opponents. 
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behavior in sequential public goods games depends on the contributions made by others 
and classify the strategies that participants use. 50% of their participants are classified as 
“conditional cooperators” (participants whose contribution in the role of fourth group 
member is increasing in others’ contributions) and 30% are classified as free riders 
(participants whose contribution in the role of fourth group member always is zero). 
Fischbacher and Gächter (2006) extend this elicitation procedure to a two-part 
experiment. In one part they classify people in the sequential public good game, and in 
the second part participants play a 10-period repeated simultaneous-move public good 
game in a stranger environment with random rematching after every game. The 
distribution of types is similar to that of Fischbacher et al. (2001), and these type 
classifications are found to be a good predictor of behavior in the repeated public good 
experiment. They argue that preference heterogeneity in the sequential public good game 
can be used to understand better the dynamics of simultaneous-move voluntary 
contributions games in the strangers environment. 
To the best of our knowledge Keser (2000) is the only study that elicits strategies 
for a repeated simultaneous-move public good game and allows participants to 
experience their submitted strategies. Using a rather special participant pool she asked 50 
academic economists to submit strategies for playing a 25-period repetition of a 
voluntary-contributions game. Strategies were then translated into computer code and 
matched with one another in every possible group of four, generating average payoffs for 
each strategy. Participants received feedback about payoffs and could then revise and 
resubmit strategies for a second, then a third simulation. She found that in all three 
simulations, strategies typically consisted of high initial contributions, followed by a 
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phase of reciprocation, and then by a very pronounced endgame effect. With each 
simulation initial contributions increased, and endgame effects occurred earlier. The 
endgame effects she observes are stronger than in most standard experiments, perhaps 
because her participants are more sophisticated or more familiar with public goods 
experiments or because their motivations differed from those of typical experimental 
participants.5  
As we focus specifically on the role played by learning and state-contingent 
strategies in decreasing contributions in the standard repeated simultaneous-move public 
good game, our approach differs from that of the earlier studies.  Using a standard 
experimental subject pool we eliminate all possibilities of repeated interaction across 
games as participants are matched with another participant for one supergame only. 
Furthermore, to check that the elicited strategies match those of actual play of a repeated 
simultaneous-move game we conducted some control sessions with new subjects where 
subjects played an identical direct-response version of the game. 
 
3. Experimental Procedures 
The experiment was conducted at the University of Nottingham in Spring 2001. We ran 
four sessions of a direct-response treatment and four sessions of a strategy-method 
treatment, with 15 participants in each session, for a total of 120 participants. Participants 
were recruited from a pool of undergraduate students at the University and randomly 
                                                          
5 Her participants were informed that after each simulation one participant would be randomly selected to 
be paid their earnings, and also that after the experiment participants’ strategies, payoffs, and identities 
would be publicly revealed. In this latter respect her study is somewhat similar to the repeated prisoner’s 
dilemma tournaments reported in Axelrod (1984). 
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assigned to a treatment. No participant participated in more than one session of the 
experiment.  
All sessions used an identical protocol. Upon arrival, participants were seated at 
computer terminals and given a set of instructions, which the experimenter then read 
aloud (Appendix A on the JEBO website contains the instructions). As part of the 
instructional phase of the session participants completed a computerized quiz that tested 
their understanding of the game. When all participants had completed the quiz correctly, 
the experimenter continued with the instructions. 
 The decision-making phase of the session then began with a practice two-stage 
game in which the participants played against the computer for hypothetical payoffs. The 
practice game was used simply to familiarize participants with their task and the 
computer screens. Participants then played five two-stage games in which they were 
randomly and anonymously matched into groups of three, no participant ever being 
matched with another participant more than once. Participants were endowed with 2 
tokens in each stage of the game and had to decide how many tokens to place in a group 
account and how many to place in a private account. For each token an individual placed 
in the private account, that individual received £1.50, and for each token placed in the 
group account by any individual all three group members received £1. Denoting subject 
j’s contribution in stage t by xjt, participant i’s payoff from a two-stage game is 
πi = 1.5(2 – xi1) + ∑xj1 +1.5(2 – xi2) + ∑xj2  i=1,..,3 
where summations are taken over all three group members. At the end of the experiment 
one of the five two-stage games was selected at random, and the participant was paid her 
earnings from that game. These monetary incentives imply that to maximize group 
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earnings participants should contribute all tokens to the group account in all stages, 
whereas the standard game-theoretic prediction, based on own-earnings maximization, 
dictates zero contributions.  
In our direct-response treatment each participant was informed of the total 
contributions to the group account in stage one by the other two group members and then 
made a stage-two decision. In our strategy-method treatment, each participant completed 
a strategy for the two-stage game, which consisted of a stage-one contribution and a 
stage-two contribution conditional on total stage-one contributions by the other group 
members.6 At the end of the game participants were informed of own-contributions, total 
contributions by other group members, and their payoff, and they recorded this 
information on a record sheet. 
Throughout the session participants were only allowed to ask questions by raising 
their hands and speaking to the experimenter in private. Participants were not allowed to 
communicate with one another throughout the session, except via the decisions they 
entered on their terminal. At the end of the experiment participants were paid their 
earnings in private. All sessions lasted less than an hour and participants earned an 
average of £7.83 (with a minimum of £4.50 and a maximum of £12.00).  
 
                                                          
6 With this strategy-method design the strategy space grows geometrically as stages are added. For 
example, a three-stage game would require participants to complete a matrix of conditional contributions. 
Thus, submitting strategies becomes much more cognitively demanding and time-consuming as the number 
of stages grows, and we therefore focus on the simple two-stage games. Likewise, we restricted the 
endowment space to 0, 1 or 2 tokens, and group sizes to three, to reproduce a voluntary-contributions game 
structure while maintaining a relatively simple task. 
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4. Results 
Our analysis of the data starts with a brief overview. We first confirm that the behavior 
derived from the strategy method is consistent with that of the direct-response game, and 
we determine the extent to which these strategies cause contributions to decrease over the 
repeated public good game. Second, we then classify the elicited strategies, examine the 
distribution of types, and how these change with repetition. These changes in strategies 
help us assess the extent to which learning is responsible for decreasing contributions in 
the repeated public good game.  
4.1 Overview  
Average contributions are similar in our direct-response and strategy-method treatments: 
averaging over all games of the direct-response (strategy-method) treatment, participants 
contribute 37% (41%) of their endowment in stage one and 23% (23%) in stage two. 
Moreover, the time-series of contributions in the two treatments track each other closely, 
as shown in Figure 1.7
--- Figure 1 here --- 
 Formal statistical tests fail to reject the hypothesis that the two elicitation methods 
induce the same contribution behavior. Using two-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum tests applied 
to session-level data from all games we find no significant difference across treatments 
for either stage-one contributions (p = 0.561) or stage-two contributions (p = 0.773). We 
also find no significant differences in contributions if we focus on any given game.8 All 
of these tests compare two sets of four observations, a rather conservative use of the data. 
                                                          
7 Average contributions for each stage of each session are tabulated in Appendix B on the JEBO website. 
8 The p-values are 0.363 (game 1), 0.883 (game 2), 0.307 (game 3), 0.549 (game 4) and 0.309 (game 5) for 
comparisons using stage-one contributions. The corresponding p-values using stage-two contributions are 
0.243, 0.468, 0.773, 0.554, and 0.885. 
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We also made the same comparisons using individual-level data (i.e., comparing two sets 
of 60 observations). Although this procedure is biased toward finding significant 
differences because it overstates the number of independent observations, we still fail to 
find any significant differences between elicitation methods.9
We also examined changes in contributions between stages one and two. Using a 
two-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum test applied to session-level data from all games, we again 
find no significant difference between the two elicitation methods (p = 0.468), and with 
one exception for the case of game 1, we also find no significant differences between 
treatments if we focus on a given game or use individual-level data.10 The overall 
message is that our strategy-method treatment generates behavior remarkably consistent 
with that of a direct-response method. 
The time-series displayed in Figure 1 are similar to those from previous 
experiments in that contributions decline within each two-stage game. In game one for 
example, contributions decrease from 45% to 32% of token endowments (averaging over 
all eight sessions). Moreover, the same pattern is seen in subsequent games: contributions 
fall from 36% to 26%, 39% to 23%, 41% to 18%, and 31% to 14% in games two through 
five respectively.11 Thus, on average, contribution rates decrease by 16 percentage points 
between stage one and two, corresponding to an average decrease of contributions of 
41%. Similar decreases are observed in each treatment (38% and 45% for the direct-
                                                          
9 The p-values are 0.280 (game 1), 0.966 (game 2), 0.575 (game 3), 0.915 (game 4), 0.335 (game 5) and 
0.448 (overall) for comparisons using stage-one contributions. The corresponding p-values using stage-two 
contributions are 0.281, 0.441, 1.000, 0.628, and 0.837. 
10 Based on session-level data the p-values are 0.020 (game 1), 0.307 (game 2), 0.884 (game 3), 0.559 
(game 4), 0.147 (game 5) and 0.468 (overall). The corresponding p-values using individual-level data are 
0.056, 0.577, 0.567, 0.661, 0.245, and 0.433.  
11 While end-game contributions are quite similar to those of Isaac and Walker, stage-one contributions of 
the two-stage game tend to lie below stage-one contributions of the ten-stage game. 
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response and strategy-method treatments respectively). Indeed, average stage-two 
contributions are lower than average stage-one contributions in all eight sessions; thus 
stage-two contributions are significantly lower than stage-one contributions (using a one-
sided Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test, n = 8, p < 0.005). 
 Figure 1 exhibits substantial ‘restart effects;’ that is, after contributions decline 
within a game, they restart at a higher level at the beginning of the next game. While this 
effect is not significant for the first restart, that is, the transition from game one to game 
two, (p-value = 0.6367 using a one-sided Binomial test), it is significant for the other 
three (p-value = 0.035 for the second restart, and p-value = 0.0039 for the third and fourth 
restarts).12  
4.2 Individual Strategies: Game One 
Next we analyze the strategies elicited in the first game. With four strategy-method 
sessions, each involving fifteen participants, we elicited strategies from sixty participants. 
Figure 2 presents the strategies initially submitted for the second stage by each 
participant, demonstrating substantial heterogeneity across participants. Following  
Fischbacher et al., we classify participants into four categories. Of our sixty participants, 
35% contribute nothing independent of the contributions of others (free-riders), while the 
contribution schedules are increasing for 38% (conditional cooperators), hump-shaped for 
15%, and cannot easily be classified for the remaining 12%.13  
 
                                                          
12 The restart observed here differs slightly from that of Andreoni (1988) and Croson (1996), as they focus 
on the cases where participants either continue with the same group of people after the restart or are 
rematched with new people after every decision in the game.  
13 The corresponding percentages in the four person sequential public good game reported by Fischbacher 
et al. were 30%, 50%, 14%, and 7%, and by Fischbacher and Gächter were 23%, 55%, 12%, and 10%. 
They use a slightly different classification procedure based on Spearman rank correlation statistics (see 
their paper for details). 
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--- Figure 2 here --- 
 
In examining how our participants’ stage-one decisions relate to their stage-two 
decisions, we observe some consistency. There is a systematic relation between stage-one 
decision and the type-classification based on stage-two decisions, and we reject the 
hypothesis that the distribution of types is independent of stage-one decisions (χ2(6) 
=13.46, p-value = 0.036). As can be seen in Table 1, of the eighteen participants who 
contributed zero in stage one, 67% were classified as free-riders and 22% were classified 
as conditional cooperators, while of the seventeen participants who contributed two 
tokens, 24% were classified as free-riders and 53% as conditional cooperators. Thus, our 
results mirror Brandts and Charness (2000) and Fischbacher et al. (2001) in that stage-
one contributors are more likely to be conditional cooperators.14 Table 1 also reveals that 
almost half of the participants who free ride in the second stage nonetheless made a 
positive contribution in the first stage. Thus free riders too cause contributions to 
decrease with repetition. 
--- Table 1 here --- 
 The notion of consistency addressed by these data is quite limited. An own-
earnings maximizer may either contribute or not in stage one, depending on his beliefs 
about how other participants respond in stage two. Similarly, a participant who prefers to 
contribute, but only so long as others also contribute, may either contribute or not in stage 
                                                          
14 Brandts and Charness had participants play two games, once as first-mover and once as second-mover 
(against different opponents and with no feedback between the two games). This allowed them to note a 
certain consistency in participants’ decision rules in the two roles: when making decisions as second-
movers, first-mover cooperators were much more likely to respond positively to a cooperative move than 
first-mover defectors. Fischbacher et al. also require participants to make decisions in two roles and note a 
similar consistency across decisions in each role. Conditional cooperators contribute 42% of their 
endowment, on average, when they make an unconditional decision, while free riders contribute 10%.   
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one, depending on his beliefs about other participants’ contributions in stage one. In the 
next sub-section we will examine a different notion of consistency by studying how 
participants’ strategies develop across games. 
The predominance of free-riding and conditionally cooperative strategies implies 
that on average stage-two contributions increase with stage-one contributions, albeit with 
a rather shallow slope. At best contributing one additional token in stage one increases 
the stage-two contribution by each of the other group members by 0.25 tokens.15 Fitting a 
line through the conditional contribution schedules using a simple OLS approximation 
for game one yields  
stage-two contribution = 0.29 + 0.16*(aggregate stage-one contributions  
      by other group members). 
 
Thus, by contributing an additional token in stage one a participant induces other group 
members to increase their stage-two contributions by 0.16 tokens each, on average; as 
this is not sufficient to cover the £0.50 contribution cost, it is not worthwhile for an own-
earnings maximizer to contribute in stage one.16 Given this relationship between stage-
two contributions and stage-one contributions, stage-two contributions will be below 
stage-one contributions as long as stage-one contributions exceed 21% of endowments; in 
fact stage-one contribution rates were 45%, easily exceeding this threshold.17
                                                          
15 The marginal increase in tokens by other group members depends on the initial contribution level.  
Increasing the contribution by other group members from 0 to 1 or from 1 to 2 tokens will on average 
increase the contribution by each of the other group members by 0.25, going from 2 to 3 it increases 0.1, 
and from 3 to 4 it increases 0.03. The average stage-one contribution by other members is 1.97 in game 
one. 
16 This result is based on the submitted strategies; if we instead look at the actual responses that were 
carried out, the corresponding coefficient on contributing would be 0.18. 
17 That is, denoting average stage-two contribution by s2 and average stage-one contribution by s1, since 
aggregate stage 1 contribution by others equals 2s1 we can see that s2 < s1 ⇔ 0.29 + 0.16 * 2 * s1 < s1 ⇔ s1 
> 0.42. 0.42 tokens represent 21% of the endowment. 
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4.3 Individual Strategies: Development across Games 
Next we examine how learning influences behavior, that is how behavior changes across 
the five repetitions of the games. Twenty-two of our sixty participants submitted the same 
type of strategy in every game. Thirteen of these submitted free-riding strategies in every 
game, and seven submitted conditionally cooperative strategies in every game. This 
leaves almost two-thirds of our participants whose strategy classification varies from 
game to game.  
 With sixty participants, each having four opportunities to revise their strategies, 
there are 240 opportunities for participant-strategies to change. Table 2 presents a 
transition matrix indicating the transition rates from each class. For example, 92 free-
riding strategies were observed in the first four games, and in 80% of these cases the 
participant remained in the free-riding category in the next game. Similarly, participants 
classified as conditional cooperators usually remain in the same category in the next 
game. In contrast, participants in the “hump-shaped” or “other” category usually transit to 
a different category. 
--- Table 2 here --- 
Transitions from one category to another occur throughout the experiment: of 
sixty subjects 20 are classified differently in games one and two, 24 in games two and 
three, 21 in games three and four, and 15 in games four and five. A variety of 
explanations may account for these transitions. One possibility is that a participant whose 
behavior changes across games does not have stable preferences, while another 
possibility is that the participant is aware of what outcomes they prefer, but is learning 
how best to achieve them. This suggests caution should be used when interpreting 
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strategies and their development over time. First, if participants do have stable 
preferences, elicited strategies do not map onto these in a direct way. Second, if we 
interpret changes in behavior from game to game as ‘learning,’ many of the observed 
transitions suggest that this goes beyond simply learning how best to maximize own-
payoff.  
Figure 3 shows the distribution of strategy-types across the five games. 
Depending on the game, free-riding strategies account for between 33% (game two) and 
45% (game five) of submitted strategies, while conditionally-cooperative strategies 
account for between 35% (game four) and 42% (game two) of submitted strategies. What 
is clear from Figure 3 is that together, free riding and conditionally cooperative strategies 
predominate throughout the experiment.  We also see that the distribution of types is 
fairly stable over the course of the experiment.  
--- Figure 3 here --- 
The implication of these distributions of strategy-types for the average response 
function is shown in Figure 4. The presence of conditionally cooperative strategies 
generates a response function that increases in others’ stage-one contributions, but the 
rate of increase is dampened by the presence of free-riding strategies.  
--- Figure 4 here --- 
 From Figure 4 it appears that the average response function is approximately an 
increasing linear function that shifts downward from game to game. Table 3 reports the 
results of using simple OLS to approximate the average response function by a straight 
line. The slopes vary from 0.14 to 0.17, indicating that if a participant were to increase 
his stage-one contribution by a token, the aggregate contributions made by others in stage 
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two would, on average, increase by between 0.28 and 0.34 tokens. Thus, the degree of 
responsiveness, as measured by this slope, does not vary much and is never strong 
enough to make it worthwhile for an own-earnings maximizer to contribute in stage 
one.18  The more apparent change over time is with respect to the intercept of the 
response function, which falls steadily across games. Thus participants respond less 
generously to a given level of others’ stage-one contributions as games progress. A linear 
average response function with a slope less than ½ implies that if stage-one contribution 
rates exceed some critical percentage of endowments, then average stage-two 
contributions will be lower than average stage-one contributions. Given the estimated 
response functions presented in Table 3, these critical percentages are 21%, 20%, 17%, 
12%, and 10% for games one through five respectively. Note that these critical 
percentages all are far below the contribution rates observed in the experiment. 
--- Table 3 here --- 
The actual dynamic pattern of contributions depends on how stage-one decisions 
and the stage-two response function develop over games. As seen in Figure 1, 
contributions in stages one and two appear to be lower in game five than game one. 
Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks tests support this impression: stage-one 
contributions are significantly lower in game five than game one (n = 8, one-sided p < 
0.01), as are stage-two contributions (n = 8, one-sided p < 0.005). However, the effect of 
experience is quite erratic from one game to the next; for example, stage-one 
                                                          
18 If we instead use actual behavior to estimate the marginal increase in contributions, we find coefficients 
ranging from 0.14 - 0.22. Alternatively we may look at the average marginal response at each contribution 
level in each of the five games; doing so we find marginal responses ranging from 0.03-0.25. Thus, at best 
a contributor will break even by contributing in stage 1, and with the exception of the first game her 
monetary return is always strictly lower from contributing in stage 1 (the largest marginal return is 0.19 in 
the remaining games).  
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contributions actually increase between games 2 and 3 and between games 3 and 4. 
Stage-two contributions show a more regular pattern of decrease across games. Overall, 
both stage-one and stage-two contribution rates vary quite widely around an average 
decrease of 4 percentage points per game. This corresponds to an average decrease in 
contributions in stage one of 7% and in stage two of 16%. Thus the decay in 
contributions from one game to the next (for a given stage) is lower and less stable than 
the decay from the first to the second stage (for a given game). 
 
5. Conclusion 
Previous experiments where participants repeatedly make voluntary contributions to 
public goods consistently result in a declining pattern of contributions. The existing 
literature has discussed two mechanisms that can lead to this pattern. One is that 
declining contributions are the result of reduced confusion as participants gain experience 
with the game. The other is that declining contributions result from the interaction of 
agents with heterogeneous motivations and reflect deliberate strategies whereby some 
participants condition their contributions on past contributions by others. In one of our 
experimental treatments participants submit strategies for playing a two-stage game and 
repeat this process five times, against new opponents each time. This treatment allows for 
a direct comparison of the effects of strategic responses and learning.  
As in previous studies that elicit strategies in social dilemma experiments, most 
strategies can be classified as either free-riding (contributing nothing in the second stage 
of our game, regardless of others’ contributions in the first stage), or conditionally 
cooperative (where stage-two contribution is increasing in others’ stage-one 
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contributions). The observed distribution of submitted strategies is robust across the five 
repetitions and results in declining contributions within our two-stage voluntary 
contribution games: on average, stage-two contributions are 45% lower than stage-one 
contributions. Thus, deliberate strategic choices made by heterogeneous agents generate a 
substantial decrease in contributions. 
However, for almost two-thirds of our participants the elicited strategy type falls 
in different classes in different games. This suggests caution be exercised in interpreting 
someone who uses a ‘conditionally cooperative strategy’ as a ‘conditionally cooperative 
person.’ We suggest that, as in many other experiments, these changes in behavior over 
time reflect some type of learning. Participants in our experiment are not able to dictate 
the outcome of a game, so even if they have well-defined preferences over the outcome 
of the two-stage game, they may not necessarily know what strategy best serves these 
interests. The changes in strategy may then reflect the attempts of participants to find the 
strategies that best work for them. Under this interpretation it is important to point out 
that transitions from one class of strategy to another are not always in the direction that 
serves the interests of selfish participants. Thus, participants are not simply learning how 
to maximize own payoff.  
Indeed, although individuals switch between strategy-classes throughout the 
experiment, the distribution of strategy-types is quite stable, so experience has a 
relatively small effect on average contributions. On average, stage-one contributions fall 
by about 7% each time the two-stage game is repeated.  
This direct approach to testing the ‘strategy’ and ‘learning’ hypotheses leads us to 
conclude that strategic responses have a more pronounced and systematic effect than 
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learning. The decline in contributions is much greater and more reliable across the two 
stages of a given game than across a given stage of successive games. In extrapolating 
this conclusion to the causes of declining contributions in other experiments, two further 
comments are in order.  
First, we focus on a game that is simpler in many respects than that used in more 
conventional public goods experiments. Our game consists of three players (compared 
with four players in the “small” group treatments of Isaac and Walker); each player 
decides how to allocate a two-token endowment (compared with at least a ten-token 
endowment in Isaac and Walker) in each of two stages (compared with ten stages in Isaac 
and Walker). These differences between our game and the more conventional one were 
dictated by our implementation of the strategy method; whether the dynamics in 
contribution behavior differs according to these variables is an open question. 
Second, a possible way to account for our results is that our strategy-method 
approach encourages participants to think about the two-stage game in a way that they 
would not if they were playing the two stages in sequence. If this were the case, then our 
strategy-method results may have little to say about the declining pattern of contributions 
in other experiments where subjects are not required to submit strategies for playing the 
entire game. However, our results from a control treatment using a direct-response 
method do not square with this account. In our direct-response treatment subjects 
contribute 37% of their endowments in stage one (compared with 41% in the strategy-
method treatment) and 23% in stage two (compared with 23% in the strategy-method 
treatment). The similarity between contributions under the two elicitation methods makes 
us confident that our results are not an artifact of the strategy method.  
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ptFigures   Figure 1.  Average Contributions by Game (Note: The left end of each line indicates the mean contribution 
in stage one, and the right end indicates the mean in stage two).  
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Figure 2: Stage-Two Strategies in Game One (Note: x-axis measures the aggregate stage-one contribution by other 
group members, y-axis measures the participant’s conditional stage-two response. A panel represents one participant). 
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Figure 3. Distribution of Strategy Types across Games 
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Figure 4. Strategy Method: Stage-Two Average Contribution Schedule 
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Table 1. Distribution of types by stage-one contribution 
 Fraction (percentage) of 
contribution 
in stage one 
Conditional 
Cooperators Free-riders 
Hump-
shaped Other 
0 3/18 (17%) 12/18 (67%) 2/18 (11%) 1/18 (5%) 
1 11/25 (44%) 5/25 (20%) 4/25 (16%) 5/25 (20%) 
2 9/17 (53%) 4/17 (24%) 3/17 (18%) 1/17 (6%) 
    
Table 2. Transitions between types across games 
percentage categorized in the following game as: category number observed 
in any of the first 
four games 
Free Rider Conditional 
Cooperator 
Hump-
shaped 
Other 
Free Rider 92 80 12 2 6 
Conditional 
Cooperator 
91 17 69 2 12 
Hump-
shaped 
24 12 25 42 21 
Other 33 21 33 6 40 
 
Table 3. Linear approximations to stage-two conditional response schedule 
 game 
 1 2 3 4 5 
intercept 0.29 0.26 0.24 0.17 0.15 
slope 0.16 0.17 0.15 0.14 0.13 
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